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As ground rent deeds are usually drawn at-the present day, theowner of the rent has three remedies for the recovery of the arrearages-viz: by action, distress, and (for want of, sufficient distress,).
the right to re-enter and hold as of the grantor's former estate.
The progregs and the reasoning of the decisions relating to theseseveral remedies, as they affect the right of the owner of the rent to
recover the arrearages, either with or without interest from the timeeach payment becomes due, as he should resort to the one remedy
or the other, or as the deed should give one or all of them, as also.
the extent of his rights when they coine into conflict with other lien
creditors, or when there has been a judicial Bale of the land without
satisfaction of the arrearages, is somewhat curious.
The leading case upon this subject is that of Bantleon vs. Smith,
2 Binn. 146, decided in December, 1809. In this case the owner
of the rent brought covenant for the arrearages; the land was sold,
upon his judgment and the proceeds brought into Court. The plain-tiff moved to take out of Court his debt, interest, and costs-claim-ing interest on each payment from the time it fell due to the time.
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of the sale. There were judgments prior to the plaintiff's judgment, but subsequent to the reservation of the rent, sufficient to absorb the fund. The plaintiff claimed priority. The ground rent
deed contained the grantee's covenant to pay the rent; a power to
enter and distrain, and for the want of sufficient distress to hold the
land until the arrearageswere fully paid; but no power to enter

and hold 'as of the grantor's former estate. The plaintiff was held
entitled to the principal of the arrears, out of the fund, but not to
interest-and this in preference to the other claimants.
Against the plaintiff's claim to priority it was argued-First, That
by resorting to the personal remedy against the grantee by action
of covenant, the land was totally discharged from the rent. And
if not so then, secondly, that the remedies given by the deed were
not cumulative, but alternative. That the plaintiff might have distrained; or for want of sufficient distress might have entered and
held; or he might resort to the person of the grantee. But he
could not enter if there was a sufficient distress; nor pursue the
covenant to judgment and then distrain for satisfaction. That
the lien of the landlord for his .arrears is founded exclusively
upon his right to distrain and for want of sufficient. distress to re-enter; that if the right is gone he stands upon the footing of a common creditor; that if the rent is extinguished, the rights of distress
and re-entry are extinguished also. And that-the rent was extin.guished by merger in the judgment, which was to be levied by ex-ecution and took its rank among other judgments solelytfrom its
date. That interest, at any rate, could not be recovered, first, beeause rent itself is interest; and 8econdly, the landlord should
have made a demand on the land, and he had the means of preventing delay, and moreover, in this case there was no penalty by which the
tenant could forfeit his estate; the rule being that if the tenant forfeits his estate at law, and the landlord exercises his right of entry,
the tenant being forced to ask equity, might be laid under terms.
For the plaintiff it was contended that the land itself having been
liable in the first instance for the arrears, he was entitled -to the
same priority out of the proceeds. That the plaintiff had three
remedies; distress, entry and covenant, and he might use them all
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until he obtained complete satisfaction. That th6 remedy by distress, or by entry for want of distress, was not affected by the judgment in covenant-the 'judgment may alter the security, -but it was
no satisfaction; it was no extinguishment of the original security
unless it produce the fruit of a judgment, and the plaintiff's
rights were therefore the same as they would have been if he had
obtained ho judgment himself, but the land had been sold under
the judgment of another; in which case there could be no doubt,
it was said, his lien would still continue, and he would be entitled
to prior satisfaction out of the proceeds. That interest should be
allowed because it was due upon all liquidated sums from the instant the principal becomes payable, either as damages for delay,
or as compensation for the use. ,
Chief Jutice .Tilghman, who delivered the opinion of the Court,
laid it down that the action of covenant for arrears of ground rent
was not like the writ of annuity, which was a mere personal.remedy,
andbyrdsort ng to which, as in the case of -a rent charge, t.eparty
made hi election to bind the person exclusively, and thus discharged
the land from all further, liability; but that in the case of covenant
for ground rent the land was not discharged. That the remedies
were cumulative, and a resort to one did not exclude a resort to the
others until satisfaction. That the judgment in covenant, therefore
did not extinguish the rent; "but the rent still exists, or in other
words, there still exists a debt on account of the arrears of rent ;"
that the landremained charged with the rent notwithstanding the
judgment; and the plaintiff was entitled to receive the arrears out
of t e fund, in preference to the other claimants, but without interest.
As we understand the reasoning of this case, it is, in substance,
this: The judgment had not destroyed the lien of the arrears of
rent-this continued to exist, independently of the judgment.
That such is the case is proved by the fact that notwithstanding
the judgment, the arrears could be recovered by the other remedies
provided by the deed. This independent lien of the rent existing,
the plaintiff was entitled by virtue of it, and not by reason of the
judgment, to come in upon the fund and receive the amount of his
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arrearages, to the exclusion of those whose liens were subsequent
to the lien of the arrearages: viewing the case as though the fund in
Court had been raised by a sale under the judgment of a stranger.
The Court, attaching no importance to the fact that the fund was
the fruit of a sale upon a judgment for arrears of the rent, nor
basing the right of the plaintiff to a relation back of the lien of the
judgment, and awarding to him the arrears upon that judgment,
but simply and exclusively upon the independent lien of the rent.
If thi§ is a correct view of the principle upon which this case was
decided-and it is to be inferred that the lien of the judgment does
not relate back to the creation of the rent-the principle, we submit, is unsound, because if the latter were the case, estates' and
mortgages coming within the Act of April 6, 1830, 1 rought into
existence subsequently to the creation of the rent, would not be devested by the sale for arrearages, which is contrary to the well set.
tled law.
As to interest upon the arrears, the Court confined theit opinion
to the case before them, and thought the plaintiff not entitled,'because, in that case, he had resorted to the land only, and the Chief
Justice says: "If a man distrain for rent, he must distrain for the
precise sum due. He cannot add interest to the arrears. If the
plaintiff had entered on the land by virtue of the power in this
deed, he could only have held till the arrears were paid. We'do
not say how the case would be, if the deed gave him power to enter
and hold as of his former estate; for, in that case, his former estate
in fee, being revested in law, the defendant would be 'driven to
equity for relief, and in equity it might be thought reasonable to
relieve on terms of paying interest." And this question is declared
open for discussion when it should arise.
Here, interest was denied upon the peculiar covenants of the
deed. The'only clause which enabled the plaintiff to re-enter and
hold the land, determined that holding upon the payment of the arrearages merely. This being all he was entitled to upon re-entry,
and he having resorted to the land, he was held entitled only to
what he could have obtained by re-entry-intimating that a: princiI Pamp. Laws, 1830, page 293.
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ple of equity might have been invoked, and the result might have
been different, had the deed contained a clause of re-entry as of the
grantor'sformer estate.

This case is referred to byall the subsequent cases as the leading
authority upon this subject, and as settling the right of the owner
of the ground-rent to be paid his arrearages out of the fund derived
from a judicial sale of the land, and this in preference to lien creditors claiming under liens subsequent in date to the creation of the
rent. Upon the argument of this case, however, the manuscript case
of Potts vs. Rhoades, decided in the Court of Common Pleas for
Philadelphia, by Biddle,, P. J., in which the law was held the
same way, was cited by counsel, and referred to in the opinion of the
Court as entitled to great weight.
The next case was that of Sands vs. Smith, (3 W. & S. 9,) decided at December Term, 1841. There had been a sale of the land
under a mortgage. Subsequently a distress was made upon the land
for arrears of rent which had principally accrued prior to the sale,
with interest upon the arrearages, and the goods were replevied.
The deed contained a covenant by the grantee to pay the rent and
the clause of distress; but gave no right of re-entry either to hold
until the arrears were paid, or to hold as of the grantor's former
estate. The land was granted in fee, but the rent was reserved for
a term of years, to commence after the lapse of seven years from
the date of the deed. The cause came before the Court below upon
a case stated, and judgment was given for the plaintiff in replevin.
This judgment was reversed in the Court above, where it was held
that the defendant was at liberty to distrain for the arrears due at
the time of the sheriff's sale.
Chief Justice Gibson delivering the opinion of the Court, says
he "never understood on what principle of lien the case of Bantleon vs. Smith was decided," but declares it "not to be his purpose
to disturb, 'or cast the least shadow on its authority, or to do more
than show that it is not founded in any principle of lien peculiar to
the reservation of a ground rent which it is necessary to carry out
further than the decisions have already carried it." The Chief
Justice then alludes to the case of Nichols vs. Postlethwaite,
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(2 DalI. 131,) in which a legacy charged on land was allowed to be
taken out of 'the price of it in the sheriff's hands, and'says thlat
this, as well as all others of the same ,stamp, depend for. their authority exclusively on precedent, and their very.great convenience,
as well as on the policy of giving the sheriff's vendee a clear title,
when it is practicable. But that neither'policy nor- coivenience
will justify ai extension of the principle of them tothe price of
land which was not liable to be reached for the debit; "and'that in
all of the piecedents the money was not only charged, but there
was a means of subjecting the land to the payment of it. He then
adverts to the fact that in Bantleon vs, Smith, the' deed contained a
clause of.re-entry by which the land itself might have been seized,
and the produce of it applied to the payiment of the rent; and also
that in Nichols vs. Po8tlethwaite, the land might have been sold on
judgment and execution for the legacy, and suggests that it was,
perhaps, the difficulty of reaching it in either of those ways,_ which
induced the Courts to apply the proceeds" of it when turned into
money. Ile then asks, "Now, what is the reimedy by distress-the
only one provided in this conveyance ?" .And he answers, "It is
as much a personal one as an action on a covenant in the deed; it
is even more so, as the land may be reached by such an action,
while it cannot be reached by a distress, ' hich operates merely on
chattels found upon it."
It is true that in this case, as stated by Stroud, J. .in 'Western
Bank'vs. Willitts (2 P. L. J 46), the rent is reserved for a term of
years, but the Court draw no distinction between such a case and
an ordinary reservation in fee, and the whole scope of the reasoning
treats the rent as an ordinary ground rent; and the case is discusscd
in reference to the authority of Bantleon vs. Smith.
The case, however, at first sight appears somewhat ambiguous,
and this because so much stress seems to be put upon the allegation
that there were no means provided by the deed of subjecting the
land to payment of"the rent. It proceeds upon the assumption
that distress was the only remedy provided by the deed for the
ree.overy of the rent; that there was no means thereby given for
subjecting the land to the payment of it; that, theiefore, there could
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be no resort to the fund which was the proceeds of the sale of the
land; and that where such was the case, at any rate, the right of
distress, which was a totally distinct remedy from any looking to
the laid itself, remained unaffected by the sale.
The Chief Justice refers to the case of Nichols vs. Postlethwaite
with apparent -approbation, certainly without gainsaying it, and
assigns as the probable reason why the Court, in that case, sanctioned
a resort to the fund, that the land might have been sold on judgment
and execution for the legacy. Now, in the very case of Sands vs.
Smith, which the Chief Justice was deciding, precisely the same
thing could have been done, for the remedy by distress was not the
only one furnished by the deed, but the covenant to 1bay was there
also, by means of which the land "might hae been sold on judgment and execution" for the rent. It might, therefore, seem that
if the Chief Justice intended to endorse the case of Nichols vs.
Postlethwaite,upon the ground named by him, he must have overlooked the facts in Sands vs. Smith, and the reasoning upon which
the decision in the latter case is based would be, therefore, erroneous.
But we do not think this a correct view of the case. The Chief
Justice adverts to the fact that in all the .precedents the money was
charged on the land. In NAichols vs. Postlethwaite, although the
legacy was not expressly charged upon the land, yet it was thus
charged by operation of law, and the judgment and execution would
have been but the means of reaping the fruits of this charge, whereas,
in Sands vs. Smith, there having been -o right of re-entry provided
by the deed, the rent, as we shall have occasion hereafter to remark,
was not a charge on lien upon the land, and an execution upon a
judgment for such rent could be levied'upon the land only in the
same manner as it could be levied upon any other property of the
defendant. In the one case the land was made debtor for the
money, without regard to the judgment, and in the other it
was not.
We have said the reasoningupon which the decision in Sands vs.
Smith was based might seem erroneous, if the case of .Nichols vs.
Postlethwaitewere sustained upon the ground mentioned; and we
have said this because we are not prepared to affirm that the result
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would have been different had the Court been of opinion that under
the deed the owner of the rent could have resorted to the fund3
(although the argument certainly leans that way) for the Court seem
to intimate that, upon principle, whether the arrears of the rent be
thrown upon the lien creditors, or on the purchaser, "the remedy
by distress of chattels on the land is as accessible in the one case
as in the other; and there is no legal necessity that the arrears
should be taken out of the fund in Court." The doctrine of the
case of Bantleon vs. Smith is, that the remedies Pre -concurrent,
and all may be pursued until satifaction. Suppose, then, a resort
to the fund without any, or without complete satisfaction--does not
the right of distregs ail exist for the whole in the one case, and
the balance in the o4h~er? Nay, further, is not the doctrine of this
case broad enough to pavction the idea that, though the deed ,coutains all the usual covenants, there is no obligation on: the part of
the owner of the rent to resort to the fund, in order to preserve his
right of distress? If each of the several remedies may be pursued
until satisfaction, and if a judicial sale does not, as is shown by
$ands vs. Smith, necessarily destroy the right of distress in the
same manner as the lien against the land itself for the rent would
be devested, this result might seem to follow. At all events the
extent to which the cases have gone is, that where the deed provides
an express remedy against the land, the owner of the rent ?aust
resort' to the fund, and the land passes to the purchaser discharged
of any liability against it; but if the deed provides no such remedy,
or no such remedy by re-entry, the right of distress remains. No
case has held that the right of distress is gone when the deed gives
the remedy, by re-entry, against the land. And if this right survives, since ground rents are rents service, to which distress is
inseparably incident, the case would not seem to be altered if the
deed did not contain the clause of distress.
As to the "priniple of lien" on which Bantleon vs. Smith was

decided, and which Chief Justice Gibson declared he could never
understand, we have now a word to say.
The distinguished counsel who argued the cause for the judgment
creditors stated, that the "lien of a landlord for his arrears is
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founded exclusively upon his right to distrain, and for -want of distress to re-enter." The Court assumed the lien to exist, but evidently did so upon the grounds on which the argument of counsel
had placed it; for in discussing the question of interest upon the
arrears, Chief Justice Tilghman limits the right of the owner of the
rent to the principal of the arrears, because his right of re-entry
under the deed gave him the right of holding only until the principal was paid, and intimating that if the deed had given the right of
re-entry as of the grantor's former estate, he might have been entitled to interest also-thus measuring the extent of the lien by that of
the right of re-entry. Chief Justice Gibson, himself, surmised that
this, together with the principle of policy of giving the sheriff's
vendee a clear title where practicable, was probably the principle of
the lien. This subject is noticed and commented upon in volume
II. of Penn. Law Jour., page 182. The writer alludes to' the
decision in Bantleon vs. Smith as to the priority of the lien for
rent, and says: "But it is remarkable that no principle is referred
to by the counsel on either side, or by the Court, as the foundation
of the doctrine. It is treated all around as if it were a consequence
of the rights of distress and re-entry reserved by the deed; but
nothing is said to show how this consequence is to be inferred, nor
is the justice of the mere inference gainsayed by the opposite
counsel." It is very true that no explanation is given as to how
the priority of lien is the result of the right of distress and re-entry.
We think, however, the reason is obvious. The right of re-entry
gives to the owner of the rent the right against the grantee of the
land, and those claiming under him, to enter upon and hold the
land either until his arrears are paid, or as of the grantor's former
estate, as the case may be. This right existing, the owner of the
rent has a right to the land itself against all persons from the date
of the grantee's deed whereby the rent is reserved, down to the
last owner or incumbrancer claiming under him. In view of this
right, either because the law abhors forfeitures, or for convenience
sake, or by reason of the principle of policy of giving the sheriff's
vendee a clear title, where practicable, when the land is sold and
converted into money the Courts have held this right to the land to
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be transferred to the fund so far as to pay the arrears, sometimes
with and sometimes without interest;'according to the circumstances
of each particular case. . This right once transferred to the fund,
therefore, necessarily reverted back to the date of the ground-rent
deed, and took priority over all claiming under the grantee subsequently. This seems plain and reasonable. The writer alluded to,
however, suggests another principle by which the lien could be sustained, and which we think entitled, to consideration. It is that of
equitable lien for the purchase money of the land. A ground rent
is the purchase money, and, although the principle of equitable lien
has been exploded in Pennsylvania, as stated by Chief Justice Gibson in Sands vs. jSmith, yet, observes this writer, at the time of
Banteon vs. Smith it had not been questioned here; and the
objections to the principle are founded altogether upon our policy
as to notice of liens, which could not apply to the arrearages of
rent, as no new principle of notice is introduced.
The next case in point of time was that of Buck vs. Fisher
(4 Wh. 516), decided in 1839. This was an action of covenant for
arrears of the ground-rent. The deed contained the "usual covenants on the part of the grantee." On the trial below, the judge
charged the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to interest from the
several days on which the ground-rent became payable.: Upon
exceptions to the charge this point was given up on the argument
before the Court above, and the judgment was affirmed without
allusion to it.
This case was succeeded by Dougherty's Estate (9 W. & S. 189),
decided December Term, 1844. There had been a sale of the land
under the judgment of a stranger. Arrearages of ground rent and
interest were claimed. The deed contained the clause of distress,
and if sufficient distress not found, to enter and rent the premises
for such a length of time as might be sufficient to discharge the
rents, and if neither goods nor buildings be found, and the rent be
in arrear over one hundred dollars, then to hold as though the
indenture had not been made. - The arrears exceeded one hundred
dollars. The Court below confirmed the auditor's report, awarding
the principal without .the interest of the rent, and this judgment, on
the authority of Bantleon vs. Smith, was affirmed.
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Next followed Pancoa8t's Appeal, (8 W. &. S. 381,) decided
March Term, 1845. The land was sold under the judgment of a
stranger. The ground rent deed contained the usual covenants and
clauses of distress, re-entry, &c. The Court below decreed the
arrears of ground-rent and interest out of the fund, and this decree
on appeal was affirmed. No allusion whatever being made by the
Court or counsel, as far as appears from the case, to the claim for
interest. The opinion is very briel, re-affirming Bantleon vs. Smith,
and repeating that Sands vs. Smith was not intended to impair its
authority, and intimating' that the former case "was not thought to
be so conclusively founded in legal reasoning, as to be a rule for
cases in which the premises were not debtor for the rent, ' in which
latter description Sands vs. Smith was supposed to -fal. -In reference to the main point, the Court-6eay, "Here there was a clause
of re-entry, as there was in Bantleon vs. Smith; and as the tenant's
estate was immediately liable to 'make satisfaction, what matters it
whether it has been sold on a judgment recovered by a straniger, or
on a judgment recovered by the landlord on the covenant in his
ground rent deed? The landlord had a lien on the estate of the
tenant, and he may hae recourse to its substitute brought into
Court, however the conversion into money may have been effected."
The last case we have to notice is that of Ter-ifoven vs. Kerns,
(2 Barr, 96,) decided December Term, 1845. This was also a sale
by a stranger, and arrears of ground rent, with interest, were
claimed. No reference is made in the case to the covenants in the
ground rent'deed, but it was held, and seems to have been stated as
a general proposition, on the authority, again, of Bantleon vs.
Smith, that the owner of the rent was entitled to the pricial,but
not the interest, out of the fund.
Such are the authorities upon this subject, and we think the following conclusions are to be drawn from them:First. Without regard to the special covenants in the ground
rent deed, if the proceeds of the sale of the land are not sufficient
to paf the arrears of ground rent, the owner of the rent may distrain upon the land in the hands of the Sheriff's vendee, fdr whatcver amount the fund was deficient.
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Second. That it is at least questionable whether he is bound in
any case (except of course, that of his own sale,) to resort to the
fund, but may distrain upon the land after the sale, for the arrears
due before.'
Third. If the deed contains no clause of re-entry, and the land
is not otherwise expressly subjected to the payment of the rent,
and there is a sale under the judgment of 'astranger, the owner of
the rent can neither resort to the fund, nor the land in the purchaser's hands, but may distrain.
Fourth. If there be no clause of re-entry in the deed, and the
land is sold under a judgment in covenant for arrears,-the plaintiff
would not be entitled to any preference over those whose liens were
prior to his judgment. But,
.F
sjlh. If there is a clause of re-entry, the lien of the owner of
the rent relates back to the creation of the rent, taking precedence
of all subsequent liens,- and this whether the sale be under his own
judgment, or that of a stranger.
Sixth. If there be a clause of re-entry to hold until all arrearages are paid, and not as of the grantor's former estate, the owner
of the rent is entitled to the principal of the arrearages, but not to
the interest, and this whether the sale is under his own" judgment
for arrears, or upon that of a stranger.
Seventh. If there be a clause of re-entry to hold as of the grantor's former estate, (or "the usual covenants on the part of the
grantee,") and the sale is under a judgment in covenant for arrears,
the owner of the rent is entitled to the principal of the arrears with
interest from the time each payment became due. And,
-Eighth*In no case of distress, or resort to the fund, where the
sale has been under the judgment of a stranger, can the owner of
the rent receive more than the principal of the arrears-the precise sum due without interest. For we regard -Dougherty's-Estate,
as to interest, to be an oversight, or at any rate, overruled by the
subsequent case of Ter-ffoven vs. Kerns.
This we submit to be the result of the authorities, unless Terifoven vs. Kerns is to be taken as deciding that in all cases of a
'See'2 Penn. Law Jour. 859.
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sale by a stranger, without regard to the covenants in the deed, the
yrincipal of the arrearages are payable out of the fund; and that
interest is not recoverable at all, even in an action for arrears. As
to the latter point, the Court say "that the owner of the rent is
entitled to have the principal of the rent out of the monys arising
from the sheriff's sale, was settled in the case of Bantleon vs.
Smith, but not to the interest thereon. This rule has been uniformly observed and adhered to ever since." Now, Bantleon vs.
Smithi was an action of covenant for arrears, and the Court in YerHoven vs. Kerns,'citing the case for so general a proposition, in a
Icause where the covenants of the deed are not even alluded to,
might seem to imply that it was intended to announce a general
rule, applicable to all cases. But the Court, in Bantleon vs. Smith,
expressly disclaim any intention of laying down any general rule,
and explicitly stating that the case was decided upon the covenants
of the particular deed in that case, say that the question as to interest is open for discussion when it shall arise under'different covenants. We apprehend, therefore, that Ter-ifoven vs. Kerns must
be confined td the particular circumstances of that case-a fund
raised by'a sale under the judgment of a stranger, and'probably
nothing unusual in. the covenants of the deed.
Upon the principle of the cases we have been considering, we do
not so readily perceive why interest is allowed upon arrears of rent
in an action of covenant, and not so when paid from the fund raised
by a s le under the judgment of a stranger.
Bantleon vs. Smith, as we have just seen, was covenant for
arrears, and the party was held not entitled to interest 'because the
right of entry was limited to holding only until arrearges were paid;
the Court intimating that if the deed had given the right to enter
and hold as of the grantor's former estate, he might have been
entitled to interest also. Buck vs. Fisherwas also an action of
covenant for arrears; and the deed contained the "usual covenants
of the grantee," among them, of course, the right to re-enter and
hold as of the grantor's former estate. It is a fair inference, therefore, that interest was held to be recoverable in the latter case by
virtue of this right to re-enter. Such being the case, why should
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the right of re-entry not have the same effect when the fund produced
by a sale under the judgment of a stranger is resorted to? The
right of re-entry per se has no direct bearing upon, or necessary
connection with the action of covenant; but is a distinct and independent remedy for the recovery of the arrears of rent. The connection which does exist is altogether indirect, and brought about
by the Courts themselves. And they bring it about, as we have
seen, in this wise: upon re-entry for failure to pay the rent, the
land is forfeit at law, and the owner must seek the aid of equity,
which would relieve upon the terms of paying interet, as well as
principal. Now, forfeitures are odious in the law; and the remedy
by re-entry is an inconvenient one; therefore, the owner of the rent
shall be encouraged not to adopt this remedy for the collection of
his arrears, but when he resorti to the personal action of covenant,
he shall be entitled to recover the arrearages with intere8t. Why
does not the same argument apply where a resort is had to the
proceeds of land converted into money under the judgment of a
stranger ? It is by virtue of this right of re-entry, and for the
same reasons, that the Courts, in this case, hold the owner of the
rent to be entitled to the principal of the arrearages; and why
should he not as well be entitled to the interest? If he entered he
could hold until paid the principal and interest, but, for the reasons
given, he need not re-enter, but may come upon the fund. Why,
then, should he not come upon it to reap all the advantages to be
derived from re-entry? We perceive no reasbn for the distinction
made.
The length to which this article has extended precludes us from
doing more, in closing, than merely adverting to one or two other
points connected with our subject.
,_ previous demand for arrears of ground rent is not necessary to
the maintenance of an action of covenant against an assignee; nor
is demand necessary before making a distress.' Arrears due upon
several lots of ground by the same person to the same plaintiff, may
be recovered in one action, though the defendant has acquired title
2
to the several lots from different persons, and at different times.
IRoyer vs.

Ake, 3 P. R. 461.

2Ibid, 461.

DEVOE ET AL. vs. PENROSE FERRY BRIDGE CO.

In the case of re-entry, as is well known, much particularity is
required. To entitle the owner of the rent to enter, there must first
be a demand of the precise rent due, on the very day on which it
becomes due, and on the most notorious place on the land; and this
although the land is vacant and unenclosed. 1 Where a power of reentry is reserved for non-payment of rent, if sufficient distress should
not be found on the premises, it is incumbent on the party entitled
to the rent, who seeks to enforce this right by ejectment, to show
that there was not sufficient property on the premises to pay the
rent ;2 if there be a forfeiture for not erecting buildings on the lot,
under the stipulations of the deed, a receipt of rent after the time
provided for the erection of the buildings, is a waiver of the forfeiture ;S and if there be no clause of re-entry in the deed, ejectment
will not lie to enforce the payment of the rent.4
M.
In the Circuit Court of the United tates.
DEVOE XT AL.

vs.

THE PENROSE FERRY BRIDGE COMPANY.

1. A Court of the United States has the power to preient by injunction, the present

or future erection of any bridge under the authority of one of the States, that by
its construction will interfere with the navigation of a public stream upon which
there is a commerce to any considerable extent with other States, though such

stream lies wholly within the limits of the State. The question in such case is
relative, whether the bridge be or be not a greater obstruction to commerce than
benefit to the public.
2. In

such case, unless* irreparable damage would be done to the defendanrts

thereby, and though an answer be put in denying both the fact and the law, an
interlocutory injunction may be granted upon affidavits, at once, until further
order; and an issue may be then directed to determine whether the bridge under
its presentform, &c., is a nuisance to the navigation of the river, and if so,

whether any bridge can be constructed at the particular spot which will not be a
nuiAnce.

This was an application to Mr. Justice Grier, for interlocutory
injunctions in three cases, involving the same state of facts.

IMcCormick vs. Connell,
31bid, 51.

6 S. & R. 151.

2Newman v8. Rutter, 8 W. 51.
4
Kenege vs. Elliott, 9 W. 258.
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The following opinion was delivered by him:
GRIER, J.-Three several bills have been filed against the Penrose Ferry Bridge Company, praying for injunctions to restrain
them from erecting a bridge over the river Schuylkill. A motion
for a special injunction has been made on the notice usual in each
case. As they all involve the same questions with immaterial
differences, we shall treat them as one case.
The complainants are citizens of other States, and owners, some
of wharf property on the Schuylkill, others of coasting vessels,
barges and canal boats trading from this port, on that river, to
ports in other States.
The bills sdt forth that the river Schuylkill from its mouth to
and beyond the port of Philadelphia is, and for a long time
hath been, an ancient, navigable, public river and common highway,
free to be used and navigated by all citizens of the United Statesthat the river has a good tide-water navigation for over six miles
above its mouth to the port of Philadelphia, for ships and vessels
drawing 18 or 20 feet-that many of said ships, steamboats, barges,
&c., navigating said river, are duly enrolled and licensed at the port of
Philadelphia, a port of entry within the District of Philadelphia;
under and by virtue of the Act of Congress in that behalf made
and provided :-That foreign vessels have been accustomed to navigate, and are entitled to navigate the said Schuylkill with cargoes,
bound to the port of Philadelphia, and to discharge the same, &c.
That about a mile above the mouth of said river, the channel has
been crossed heretofore by means of a ferry skiff or scow, which
afforded ample convenience for the travel across the river without
obstructing the navigation.
That the Penrose Ferry Bridge Company, a corporation created
and established by authority of the State of Pennsylvania, and the
other defendants, citizens of Pennsylvania, have collected materials,
and are engaged in constructing and erecting a truss toll bridge
over and across the channel of said river at the site of the ferry.
That it is their intention to erect the bridge at an elevation of only
six feet above the level of ordinary high water, and not over one or
two feet above the level of the usual freshets in the river.
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The complainants charge that the erection of such a bridge as
that threatened by defendants, will greatly obstruct the navigation
of the river, and will tend greatly to destroy the trade, commerce
and business of the citizens of the United States, to their great
damage and common nuisance ;-that many millions of dollars have
been expended by citizens of the United States in the construction
of works of public improvement terminating at said port on the
Schuylkill, which will be much injured by such obstruction to the
navigation of the river.
That the defendants claim a right to erect said bridge under color
of certain Acts of the Legislature of Pennsylvania, passed on the
7th of April, 1853, and 15th of April, 1854, and pretend that
certain draws placed in said bridge will afford sufficient passage-way
for vessels navigating the river; but the complainants charge that
the river Schuylkill having a good tide-water navigation- to a part
of the port of Philadelphia, the citizens of the United States are
lawfully entitled to its full and free navigation without hindrance or
obstruction by virtue of any State authority; and they aver that
the proposed draws are utterly inadequate to meet the requirements
of the present commerce and navigation of the river; and that no
draw in any bridge to be erected there of suitable height, affording
less than one hundred feet clear channel, would afford a sufficient
passage to vessels and barges in the manner they are now accustomed to use and navigate the river.
The complainants also severally aver, that they will each suffer
special damage to their business or property, if the erection of said
bridge be proceeded with in the plan proposed.
A very large number of witnesses have been examined in support
and denial of the charges of these bills. The usual practice of this
Court on motions for special injunctions has been, to grant them as
a matter of course, where no opposition is made by the defendants,
on affidavits supporting the charges of the bill. And in patent
cases, if the defendant denies, under oath, the equity of the bill,
the Court will usually inquire no further, and will not proceed, on
a mere preliminary motion and affidavit, to try the whole merits of
the case.
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But in applications for an injunction, in case of alleged nuisance,
the practice has been somewhat different. In such cases, it is not
sufficient to deny the law, or the facts relied on in the bill, to have
the injunction refused, and the inquiry will be, whether it is not best
for all parties that the erection of the supposed nuisance should be
arrested till these questions be finally and properly decided. And
if no irreparable or very material injury will probably arise to the
defendant, the Court will issue the injunction without attempts to
adjudicate the merits by anticipation. It is usually better for all
parties that an injunction issue even in a doubtful case; till the
merits of the controversy are finally decided.
It has been my desire to pursue this course in the present case,
and to have silently granted the injunctions, without forming or
expressing any opinion on the merits, or the great questions of law
and fact involved in the case. But, as the counsel have argued the
case very fully on its merits, and as I find that illegitimate inferences have been drawn, and unnecessary fears excited, as to the
results and consequences of certain doctrines supposed to be held
by the Court on this subject, I have concluded to briefly express an
opinion upon the leading questions of law and fact in the case, notwithstanding it may appear to be an anticipation of the final hearing of the merits.
As the defendants in this case claim to act under the authority
of the State of Pennsylvania in the erection of this bridge, which it
is charged will be a nuisance to the navigation of the river Schuylkill, the right or propriety of the interference of this Court becomes
a matter of grave and serious consideration.
The river Schuylkill is wholly within the territory of tbe State.
She has exercised jurisdiction over its waters both as a State and a
colony. She has authorized the erection of a dam and three bridges
below the ebb and flow of the tide. States have an undoubted right
to regulate all matters of police, including internal commerce, roads,
ferries, canals and bridges. But the power conferred on the general government by the Constitution of the Union, to regulate commerce between the several States and foreign countries, necessarily
authorize it to keep open and free all navigable streams connecting
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the ocean with ports of delivery or entry, and protect the intercourse
between the several States on all our tide-waters. When the exercise of their several powers come into conflict, those of the State
must necessarily yield to the superior or controlling power. The
jurisdiction of this Court in cases like the present, has been fully
considered and decided by the Supreme Court in the case of The
State of Pennsylvania vs. The Wlheeling Bridge, 13 How. 519.
This Court is not at liberty, even if so disposed, to disregard the
authority of that case, and the people of Pennsylvania, at whose
instance the doctrines contained in it were established, are morally
estopped from questioning their correctness. It is there decided
that, although the Courts of the United States cannot punish by
indictment the erection of a nuisance on our public rivers, erected
by authority of a State, yet that as Courts of Chancery they may
interfere at the instance of an individual or corporation, who are
likely to suffer some special injury, and prohibit by injunction the
erection of nuisances to the navigation of the great navigable rivers
leading to ports of entry within a State.
The commerce on the river Schuylkill below the port of Philadelphia, is as much entitled to this protection as that of the Ohio,
Mississippi, Delaware or Hudson; and the complainants in thii case
have shown the same right to the interference of this Court in their
behalf, as was shown by the State of Pennsylvania in that. In
fact, every question of law which has been agitated in the argument, either in these cases, or the one which preceded them, has
been fully considered and decided by the Supreme Court in that
case, and it is unnecessary for this Court to vindicate their decision
by further argument.
Let us now proceed to examine the facts in evidence on the present motion, and how far they will justify the interference of this
Court by injunctiou. At common law, every obstruction, however
small, to the free navigation of a public river, might, in strictness,
be styled a nuisance. But the stringent application of this definition to every bridge over every creek where the tide ebbs and
flows, or which a chance sloop might occasionally visit, wou.ld be
Intercourse by
absurd and highly injurious to public interests.
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means of turnpikes, canals, railroads and bridges, is a public necessity. A railroad constructed by the authority of a State, is often
many thousand times more beneficial to the interests of commerce
than the unlimited freedom of navigation over unimportant inlets,
creeks or bays, or remote portions of a harbor. It would be unreasonable to insist that the millions who travel on them, should be
subjected to great delay or annoyance for the convenience of a few
sloops or fishing smacks.
Where bridges are constructed with draws, or openings for the
passage of masted vessels, and high enough to permit others to pass
under if possible, the occasional delay of such vessels for a short
time may be a trifling inconvenience, in comparison with the public
benefit of the bridge. In every investigation of this kind the question is relative, not absolute. Whether a certain erection be a nuisance must depend upon the peculiar circumstances of each casewhen the trade of the channel is of great amount and importance,
and that across it trifling, the same rule cannot apply, as to a case
where the conditions are contrary. If a steam ferry can amply accommodate those who cross the stream, .and a bridge with a draw
would inflict an injury on commerce, and tax the public by increased
freight, there is no sufficient reason why a bridge should be erected
because it will be more profitable stock than a steamboat or towboat, or better accommodate some small neighborhood or neck of
land.'
The city of Boston is situated on a peninsula. No public necessity could well exist which would justify a bridge, compelling all
the commerce of her port to pass through a draw; while it might
be very reasonable that vessels passing from one part of the port or
harbor to another, should be compelled to submit to some inconvenience for the sake of a bridge erected for one of the great
railroads, so important to the prosperity and wealth of the city.
It would be an abuse of the term to call the Schuylkill dam a
nuisance, because it is below tide water, and converts a few miles
of useless sloop navigation into a canal which annually adds millions to the wealth of the city and State, and whose commerce constitutes the staple of this western portion of the port of Philadel-
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phia. Nor is it any appreciable injury to the commerce of tle port
that vessels with high masts cannot pass the Market street bridge.
Ample space for those vessels still remains at the wharves below.
The great staple of this western port is coal, and this bridge is built of
such a height as not to interfere with the passage of the steam tugs
and canal boats engaged in transporting it. - The city of Philadelphia now extends across the Schuylkill, and such a bridge is a public necessity. The same may possibly be said of the Gray's Ferry
bridge, over which the railroad to Baltimore passes. Vessels with
masts and steamboats with high chimneys are, no doubt, put to considerable inconvenience in passing the draw; but the bridge is built
so high that the immense trade in coal can pass under it without
interruption. Besides, when this bridge was first erected, the commerce of the river was of little importance compared to its present
condition, and the mode of transporting the coal has accommodated
itself to the state of the navigation and its impediments, as they
then existed. If the erection of such a bridge at that place were
now proposed for the first time, its propriety might have admitted
of some doubt.
With a view to these principles, let us now examine the structure
proposed to be erected by the defendant.
1st. The bridge is to be some five or six miles below the port of
Philadelphia, although within the present city limits, and about one
mile above the mouth of the Schuylkill river.
2d. The defendants propose to erect it at a height of six or eight
feet above high water level, and two feet above the usual freshets of
the river.
3d. It is to have a pivot draw on a pier in the centre of the
river channel, which when open, will leave a passage on each side
of the pier of about 60 feet in the clear.
4th. Sailing vessels and single steamboats without tows, may
pass with some delay and inconvenience, but sufficient to cause an
increase on freight of from three to five cents a ton.
5th. A large port ion of the great commerce of this river is coal,
conveyed to the port by the Schuylkill canal, which coal boats are
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at present towed by small tugs below the Gray's Ferry bridge,
under which they can pass without delay or inconvenien'ce. The
canal boats containing the coal are then received by steamboats of
a larger class, which take them in tow, necessarily ranged four.
abreast. These would neither pass under the bridge nor through
the draws of the proposed bridge, without great danger, difficulty
and delay.
6th. The erection of this bridge will necessarily cause an entire
change in the transportation of coal on the fiver below the port.
Wharves will have to be constructed below it, and-the larger steamboats remain there; thereby greatly increasing the expense of
towage by the small boats above.
7th. It will operate as a tax upon coal, of five cents per ton, by
increasing its freight to that amount. This item alone amounts to
$20,000 per annum.
8th. The City of Philadelphia, through her Select and Common
Councils, has remonstrated firmly against any legislative license for
the erection of a bridge at this place, and declares that, by "this
dangerous obstruction, trade amounting to more than a million of
tons annually, would be seriously impaired, and driven from that
portion of the port; and that the large investments of the city in
her gas works, and other property on the Schuylkill, and a large
proportion of all the wharf front, would be greatly injured by any
farther bridge below Gray's Ferry."
9th. It is in evidence also, that the city is now at a great
expense in removing the gas works below the bridges; and among
the reasons for such a measure, was their expectation of having the
bituminous coal imported from Liverpool in large vessels, delivered
to them free from the obstruction of bridges; and that the erection
of this bridge will cause an additional cost to the city in this
matter, of fifty cents a ton on all the coal imported for her gas
works.
10th. There is no public necessity for the erection of such a
bridge over the mouth of the Schuylkill, nor any-benefits which
will at all counterbalance the evils to commerce which will be
caused by it.
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11th. The farmers of Tinicum and part of Kingsessing, to'whom
it might be a convenience (especially in winter) to have a bridge at
this place, can cross with their market wagons with as much safety
and as little delay by steamboat ferry as a bridge. If the quantity
of travel is not sufficient to support a steam ferry, it is conclusive
evidence that there is no public necessity for an erection of a bridge
which will tax commerce to such an extent.
Upon the whole, I think it is abundantly in evidence from the
testimony before me, that the proposed bridge if erected, will
greatly injure the commerce passing from and to other States,
along the river Schuylkill, to the port of Philadelphia; and also
that there is no public necessity for a bridge at that place which
can justify the sacrifice of other and superior interests to so great
an extent. I concur with the City Council-" that any obstruction
at or near the outlet of such a great public highway, must seriously
interfere with the growth of that trade, and only tend to sacrifice
great public interests to partial and individual benefit."
(See
Journals f . Councils, vol. 18, p. 157.)
Such an erection will, therefore, be a public nuisance to the
navigation of the Schuylkill river and the commercial intercourse
of other States with the port of Philadelphia, and ought to be restrained. Let the injunction issue till further order.
If the defendants de~ire to pursue this matter any farther, the
Court will order an issue to try at next term the following questions:
1st-Whether a bridge, erected as now proposed at the place
called Penrose's Ferry, would be a nuisance to the navigation of
Schuylkill river, or not?
2d-Whether any bridge can be built at that place which will not
materially affect the public interest and commerce of the river ?and if so, of what height, breadth of draw, &c.?
Nors.-It may be proper to state that the preceding case, though it involves the
same principles, is not that which gave rise to some remarks in a previous number
of this Journal; and that the bills upon which it is founded were not in fact known
to be in contemplation at the time those remarks were printed. The present bills,
indeed, are filed by different parties, and under somewhat different circumstances.
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We must also beg leave to disclaim with regard to the article to which we refer,
the least intention of applying its observations to the learned and able Court in
which these cases arose. For that Court none can have greater respect, or
can rest with more confidence on its decisions, than ourselves. Our object was only
to deprecate, with earnestness, it is true, but still with great deference, conclusions
towards which the Federal Courts in general, appeared to be -drifting. The particular case entered very little into the considerations which actuated us; it was
only the occasion, not the subject of our remarks; and it may well be that
the bridge whose erection has just been restrained, is both hurtful and useless.
When the power now claimed is exercised by a judge whose strong good
sense and thorough learning are so well known, we might be sure that it woufd be
exerted only in the way most beneficial to the public. 'But we cannot hope'that it
will always and in all places, be confided to such competent hands; and that prudence and moderation will invariably accompany its exercise. It involves, indeed,
what is substantially an act of legislative discretion; and is enforced by the summary and abrupt process of an immediate injunction.
And setting aside all constitutional considerations, there are few men to whose uncontrolled judgment we would like to trust such a power, especially in the important
matters of commerce. This, however, like unfortunately too many other innovations, presented itself with its fairest and most promising side foremost; and some
were perhaps inclined to forget, since the doctrine sought to be established would
work conveniently in the present, that the precedent might not be looked upon with
so much pleasure in the future. Willing, therefore, as we might otherwise be
to acquiesce in the wisdom and propriety of this particular decision, it was only the
more the duty of those who were convinced of the dangers which be hidden underneath these doctrines, to protest respectfully against their extension.-Eds. f. Reg.

In the Court of Appeals, South Carolina,1854.
W. H. RIVERSj ADMINISTRATOR vs. GREGG, HAYDEN & CO. AND OTHERS.

1. An infant who is furnished with necessaries, and the means in cash of procuring
them, by his parent or guardian, or from other sources, is prima fade not liable
for necessaries furnished by a stranger or tradesman on credit; and a party who
seeks to evade the operation of the rule must prove a state of destitution and necessity in the infant. Burghartvs. Hall, 4 M. & W. 727, dissented from.
2. But a policy of insurance effected by the creditor under such circumstances, on
the life of the infant as security for his debt is not affected, it seems, by its invalidity: and at any rate, the proceeds of the policy cannot be claimed by the
infant's administrator.

This was an appeal in equity from the Chancellor of the Charleston District. The facts of the cases appear in the following opinion and decree of the Court below.
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C.-William M. Edings, was a young man of large expectancies. He possessed an absolute and indefeasible estate, the
value of which has been estimated by the master, at thirty-five or forty
thousand dollars. This includes the accumulated income of the defeasible estate to which he was conditionally entitled under the will of
his grand-father, William Edings; which said income, by a decree of
this Court, has been adjudged, since the death of William i. Edings,
to belong to his estate. In addition to this, he would have been entitled, if he had attained the age of twenty-one years, to an interest in his grand-father's estate, estimated by the master, at seventyfive or eighty thousand dollars. His absolute and expectant estate
would, therefore, together have amounted to $110,000, or $120,000.
His vested estate exclusive of what his estate will receive from the
decree of the Court on account of the income of his conditional
legacy, was only about $10,000. He was born on the 22d of
November, 1830, and died on the 29th of November, 1850. On
his death, under twenty-one years, the whole of his conditional
estate passed under the limitations of his grand-father's will to his
only surviving brother, *ithout its ever having vested, except as to
the income, in William M. Edings.
In March, 1840, his mother, Mrs. Edmigs, (now Mrs. Hughes,)
was appointed by the Court of Equity, the guardian of his person
and estate. From 1840 to 1846, his guardian received from the
executor, John A. Fripp, the sum of five hundred dollars per annum for his education and support. Her accounts have been regularly returned and vouched. In 1846, by an order of this Court,
his allowance was increased to $1,000. This allowance continued
until 1848, when William M. Edings was married. On that event, his
allowance, by an order of the Courf, was increased to two thousand
five hundred dollars, which was ordered to be paid to him and not
to his guardian. His wife was also possessed of an estate, which,
on her marriage, was settled on her, for her separate use, the income
of which, was between six and seven hundred dollars. This income
went to the support of the family. The allowance ordered to be
paid to William M. Edings, which was intended for the support of
himself and family, 'added to the income from his wife's estate,
DARGAT,
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made an aggregate of $3,100 or $3,200 per annum. Ile had two
children, one of whom died before him. He left a widow, and one
child, who survived him three months. The widow still survives.
On the 23d of August, 1851, an order was made referring this
case to the master, with leave to report any spdcial matter. The
master was also ordered to publish a notice in one of the city papers, requiring all the creditors of the estate to present and prove
their demands before the said master on or before the first of September next ensuing. The accounts of the administrator of William
M. Edings were also referred to the master;' and the said administrator was ordered to pay to the master, any funds belonging to
the estate, that had, or might thereafter come into his hands.
The master now submits his report upon the matters referred.
He states, that the administrator has rendered his aqcount, and
that the same has been legally vouched. He finds a balance due
the estate by the administrator of four thousand one hundred and
four dollars and -.
No exception having been taken to this part
of the report, it is ordered, that the said report in this respect be
confirmed, and become the decree of this Court.
In the same report, the master submits a statenent of the claims
of the creditors presented before him, and of the evidence by
which they were supported. The master, in his report, has discriminated between what he considers necessaries, suitable to the fortune
and dondition of the in'testate, and mere waste and extravagance;
rejecting the latter, and allowing the former. The creditors, whose
claims have been rejected, have severally filed exceptions to the
report; contending that the rejected items of their accounts ought
to have been allowed as necessaries. I think the master has allowed enough as necessaries, in any point of view-in which the case
may be considered. And for this reason, all the exceptions filed
by the creditors are therefore overruled.
But the complainant, (the administrator with the will annexed of
William M. Edings,) has also filed exceptions to the report, in
which he disputes the right of the creditors, (under the circumstances,) to claim anything as necessaries. And this brings up a very
important question; a.question, which must be of deep concern to
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parents and guardians, and to that interesting class of the community, whom, on account of their tender years and need of protection,
the Court of Equity has under its own peculiar guardianship and
care.
To show the great importance and necessity of this protection,
I need not travel out of the facts of this case to present a striking
illustration. Under the published order to prove theie debts before
the master, creditors have presented demands against the intestate's
estate, to the enormous amount of $14,205; all, or a very large
part of which was contracted within the last four years of his life,
and principally within the last two years. Add to this, about
$9,000 for money actually received by the intestate on account of
his allowance, and on account of the income of his wife's estate,
all of which came into his bands, and was consumed, and the aggregate is about $23,000. Thus, we find this infant, whose person
and estate was under the protection and guardianship of the Court
of Equity, whose estate in possession was only $10,000, and whose
indefeasible estate eventually realized was only $35,000,-living
for the last four years of his life at the extravagant and wasteful
rate of nearly six thousand dollars per annum. And this yet, does
not present a perfect view of his extravagance. For, as has already been observed, the principle part of the debts was accumulated within the last two years of his life, when his allowance was
at its maximum, and when he also enjoyed the income, of his wife's
estate. He must have expended after his marriage, seven or eight
thousand dollars per annum. I was desirous to have gone accu.
rately into this calculation; but the master's report, and the documents and evidence submitted with it, did not afford the data.
When the Chancellor, by his order, granted this infant out of his
estate an allowance of $1,000 per annum; and after his marriage,
increased it to $2,500 per annum, did he base his decree, upon
what, from the evidence before him, he supposed was necessary for
the support and maintenance of himself and family, according to
his fortune and position? If not, how futile was the preliminary inquiry as to what were his prospects and fortune? Did he grant
him the annual allowance of $2,500, for, and in lieu of necessaries;
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or did he mean, that he should receive his allowance, and be armed
with authority to contract debts, and charge his estate with the
payment of double that sum in the way of necessaries? If this
latter principle is to prevail, then I undertake to say, that the protection which this Court affords to the estates of infants, is a bitter
mockery.
The general rule certainly is, that an infant is bound by his contract for necessaries. But there are exceptions equally clear, and
well settled.
eceassaries, when the term is applied to an infant,
are those things that are conducive, and fairly proper for his comfortable suppoit and education, according.to his fortune and rank.
So, that what would be considered necessary in one case, would not
be so regarded in another. The rule is entirely relative in its operation. But what are necessaries? Meat, lodging, clothing and
education, if the means admit of it, certainly fall within the definition. To which may be added in case of marriage, the support of
wife, children and servants. All is relative, and is regulated by
circumstances. But if an infant is furnished with these things by
his parent or guardian, then the same articles, to the same or a less
amount, supplied by another under contract, are not necessary to
him. To another, not so supplied, they would be necessary. The
same remarks apply with equal propriety and force, where the infant is supplied by parent or guardian, or by this Court, with money
to furnish himself with necessaries. In some cases, circumstances
make it proper, and imperatively demand, that the infant should
have the disbursement of his allowance himself. In the case of
marriage and house-keeping, the perpetually recurring wants and
exigencies of the family, render it impossible that the guardian
should always be called on to supervise the disbursement of the
fund allowed the infant. Or, if being a youth of fortune, he is
sent upon his travels in foreign lands, or even in his own country,
the guardian cannot look to the expenditure of the money. .It is
necessarily entrusted to his own keeping. The brother of the deceased is now abroad on his -European travels. Previous to his
departure, an application was made to this Court for a proper allowance to defray his traveling expenses. The Court, upon due
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consideration, made an order for what was supposed to be the 'proper allowance; reference being had to the amount of his fortune.
Suppose that this young gentleman should expend his allowance,
*and in addition, should contract debts to the same amount for articles that prima facie would be regarded as necessaries? Could
these claims be supported, on its being shown, teat the infant, had
an allowance that was amply sufficient to defray all his necessary
and proper expenses? I suppose not.
He who deals with an infant, is presumed to know of his infancy.
He is bound, at his own peril, to make the inquiry. It makes no
difference whether his inquiries result in correct information, or the
reverse. It is no excuse, if he honestly supposed from his appear,
ance or other circumstances, that the infant was an adult. The
protection of this defenceless class of persons would be very inadequate, if this principle is not further extended. The only safe
ile for the security of infants and their estates, is, that he who
credits the infant for necessaries, should be bound to know, whether
the infant has been.supplied with a sufficient amount of those articles by the parent or guardian, or from some other source. The
consequence, if any other rule than this prevails, would be, that
an infant's estate might be made liable for double the amount of
necessaries, that were necessary for him.
I will not say, that an infant, after being supplied with necessa:
ries, or a proper allowance in cash to procure them, may not, under some circumstances be liable on a contract for necessaries.
Suppose, for example, after being furnished with all things necessary
fof him, he should give them away, or sell them, or waste the proOr suppose, that after having
ceeds in riot and debauchery.
fIaced in his hands in money, an allowance sufficient for all his
wants, he should be robbed of it, or should lose it by accident, or
at games of chance. Then, the infant would be reduced to want
for the means of bare subsistence. Must'he starve with a plenty
in his coffers? Would he not be bound by a contract for necessaries under these circumstances? This ii stating the strongest
imaginable case against the rule. But its wisdom is still manifest.
In a case like that supposed, I would say, that the infant would be
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bound. But I would further say, that the party who alleged this
extraordinary state of facts, must prove them. In other words,
when it is shown, that an.infant is supplied with necessaries by his
parent or guardian, or with funds amply sufficient to procure them,
the presumption of law and of reason, must be, that he does not
stand in need of 6redit to obtain what is necessary for him. And
after this prinafacie showing, he who alleges, that notwithstanding
this, the infant was in a state of destitution, must take upon himself the - burthen of proving his allegation. If he does this in a
satisfactory manner, his claim should be allowed. Bat even then,
it should be limited to bare necessaries; and should not be allowed
to embrace articles of luxury, which would otherwise be suitable to
the infant's fortune and condition in-life.
To illustrate these views further, I will advert to what I suppose
would be the course which a case like this might take in a court of
law. The plaintiff brings his action of assumpsit for goods, wares,
&c. The affirmative is with him. He must prove his demand, to
be entitled to recover. The defendant, however, has pleaded infancy. This admits the account, and rests the defence upon.the
affirmation of a fact which the defendant is bound to. prove. If
to this plea, the plaintiff has replied, that the dematid was for
necessaries suitable to the defendant's fortune and condition in life,
the burthen of proof is again shifted. The plaintiff must prove his
replication. This he" does, by showing, for example, that the account is for board, clothing, education, &c. On this proof, he
would be entitled to recover. But if the defendant has rejoined,
that the articles furnished were not necessary to him, because. he
was furnished with the same articles by his parent or guardian, hiere
the proof of all the facts stated in the previous pleadings would become unnecessary. The defendant would be bound to prove his rejoinder. But if the plaintiff has filed a sur-rejoinder, alleging, that
although the infant defendant was furnished with support and
maintenance, or the means of procuring it by his parent or
guardian; yet, that by the defendant's improvidence or misfor-tune, he had wasted or lost his means, so that he was reduced
to a state of destitution, and the articles furnished by the plaintiff
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were thus become necessary for the infant, here, the affirmative is
again shifted, and the onus is with the plaintiff. In this Court,
happily, special pleading never prevailed. But what is valuable
and subservient to the ends of justice in the philosophy of that system,
is applied here in practice in a short hand way; though this Court
never suffers itself to be baffled by its subtleties, or entangled in its
technicalities.
In a case like that before me, it is not sufficient for the creditor
of an infant, for the purpose of obviating the objection that the infant was furnished witf. necessaries, or the means of procuring
them by his parent or guardian, or from other sources, to argue
hypothetically, that the infant notwithstanding, might have been
in a state of destitution, which rendered the articles furnished by
the plaintiff necessary for him. In a court of equity, as in a court
of law, he must state the fact affirmatively, and prove it positively.
The conclusion is, that an infant who is furnished with necessaries, or the means in cash of procuring them, by his parent or guardian, or from any other source, is primafame, not liable foi necessaries supplied by a stranger or tradesman on a credit; and that the
party who seeks to evade the operation of the rule, and bring his claim
under an exception, must prove the destitutibn and necessities of
the infant. And I persuade myself that the most specious' objection to the rule has been sufficiently answered.
I was pressed in the argument at the bar, with a recent English
decision; which I admit is directly to the point, and opposed to
my own conclusion in this case. But for this decision, I should not
have deemed it necessary, or incumbent upon me, to elaborate my
views upon the subject at such great length. The decision, cited
though not binding upon me, is entitled to great respect. The case
is that of Burghart vs. Hall, 4 Meeson and Welsby, Exchequer
Rep. 726. In this case, the infant had an allowance £500 of per
annum, besides his pay as a captain in the guards. Lord Lyndhurst had directed an issue to be tried by a jury. Lord Abinger, in charging the jury, had laid it down, that a tradesman would
not be at liberty to furnish necessaries to an infant, when he might
have known if he had made the proper inquiries, that the infant
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was supplied with an income for his own support. Sir L. Shadwell, had expressed the same opinion in a case against the same
party. Muturs vs. Hall, 6 Simi, 465. In Burghart vs. Hail,
the Court of Exchequer granted a new trial on the ground of misdirection of the presiding judge, with the full concurrence of Lord
Abinger, who retracted his former opinion, and alleged that he had
been coiivinced by the argument of Mr. Erle, the counsel for the
plaintiff. Lord Abinger, who delivered the judgment of the Court,
stated the law to be, that an infant is capable, not only of entering
into a contract for necessaries for ready money, but also into any
reasonable contract for necessaries on a credit, though he has an
income of his own, and an allowance that was amply sufficient for
his support. I must be permitted to say, that the argument of
Mr. Erle, though ingenious, has failed to convince me; and I prefer the first, and in my opinion, the better judgment of his
Lordship.
Lord Lyndhurst, deeming the decision in this case authoritative
without any further argument or
upon him, implicitly followed "it
and
gave
a
decree
accordingly.
precedent,
I find no case that goes this length. In McPherson on Infancy,
507, it is laid down that, "where the plaintiff has succeeded in
showing the supplies, in respect of which the action is brought, were
suitable in themselves, to the age and station of the defendant;
the latter may show, that he was supplied, no matter from what
quarter, with necessaries suitable to his situation; and in such a
case, a tradesman cannot recover for any further supply." See
Bainbridgevs. Pickering, 2 W. B1., 1835. And it has frequently
been held, that a person furnishing necessaries to an infant, under
these, and the like circumstances, is bound to make inquiry
whether the infant be not otherwise supplied. Cook vs. Payne,
3 Car. & P. 114; Story vs. Perry, 4 id.526; Ford vs. Fothergil,
1 Esp. 21.
In the case last cited, it was held by Lord Kenyon, to be incumbent on a tradesman, before he gives credit to an infant for what
may prima facie be considered as necessaries, to make inquiry
whether he is not provided by his friends. And in Story vs. Perry,
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it was decided by Lord Tenterden, that a tradesman trusts an infant
for necessaries at his own peril, and that he cannot recover, if it
turns out that the infant has been otherwise supplied.
In a more recent case, Burghart vs. Augerstein; 6 Car. & P. 690,
it was ruled, that when an action was brought against an infant for
necessaries, it was competent for him to prove that he had been supplied with the same articles (clothes) from other tradesmen besides
the plaintiff; and if the proof be,,that the defendant had been previously so supplied, the plaintiff could not recover, although the
defendant had not paid the prior bills.
To the same effect, are the cases on this subject, decided by the
Courts of South Carolina. In Conolly ads. Hfull, 3 MeO. 6, it
was held, upon what was considered "a well settled principle, that
an infant who lives with and is properly maintained by her parents,
cannot bind herself to a stranger for necessaries.". And the Court
proceeds to ,observe, "whether the mother in this instance was able,
and did maintain her daughters in a manner suitable to their condition,
did not appear; but it ought to be presumed, until the contrary be
proved." In .ldwards vs. Huyhes, 2 McCord., ch. 21, it *as ruled
that an infant is not bound for necessaries where he has a "natural
or legal guardian to provide for them."
It is a fallacy to suppose, that a distinction can be drawn between.
the cases where an infant is actually supplied- with the necessaries
themselves, and that, where he receives an allowance ulider an order,
of the Court, which he is to disburse himself in their purchase. If'
it be urged that the infant may waste or misapply his allowance,,
and thus be reduced to a state of destitution that would require his
necessary wints to be otherwise supplied, it is obvious, that the
argument applies with equal force to the case where the infant is.
supplied with the necessary articles for his use and consumption.
These he may, sell, giv, away, or waste, so, that it may become
necessary that he should have more, to save him from nakedness and
starvation. The party who alleges such a state of destitution as a,
justification for giving credit to an infant who is otherwise amplyprovided for, must take upon himself the burthen of proving it.
And if he succeeds in this, be will have such relief as is proper under
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the circumstances. But until such a state of destitution is made to
appear, it must be presumed, that an infant who has an ample allowance in cash, does not need to be supplied with necessaries on credit.
To test this question still further: If the guardian had paid these
accounts, would she have been allowed to charge them against her
ward's estate? It is a waste of time to ask the question.
No guardian has the right, without the permission of the Court,
or without special circumstances of necessity, to transcend the income of his ward's estate-in expenditures for his benefit. And the
Court in decreeing allowance, always has reference to the same
general rule, from which it never departs, unless under special circumstances. And yet, it is contended, that this rule may be violated by tradesmen for their own profit and speculation.
The truth is, that these claimants did trust this unhappy youth
at their own risk. They knew that they would be paid if he lived,
and came to his inheritance. They, for a con8ideration, doubtless,
decided to take the hazard. That this is the case, is shown by the
fact, that two of them, whose claims are the largest, insured the infant's life for an amount sufficient in one case, to save them from
loss, and in the other, to pay half the debt.
I think that the claims of these creditors should not be allowed,
for the foregoing reasons. And I further think, that they are entitled to no commiseration. There is but little doubt, that the illfated youth was brought to an untimely grave by the improper and
unbounded credit which was extended to him by these persons, and
others, for their own profit. E. W. Mathews, Esq., bears the following melancholy testimony: He says: "that Win. Edings, the minor, was his nephew. He and the mother and grand-father of Mr.
Edings, used every effort to kcep him at school during his minority;
but the large credit he obtained, placed him beyond the control of his
guardian and friends. His mother even refused him money to return
from school, and he had to borrow the same to do so. From his
knowledge of the circumstances of the case, he firmly believes that
the system of credit extended to his nephew, was the cause of his
ruin and early death; and that such is also the opinion of the mother
of Mr. Edings. Mr. Edings' mother used all her endeavors to
check this system of credit, by refusing to pay a number of bills."
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These creditors now -come-ere for payment. .They extended
every. facility to the inexperienced and infatuated victim of pleasure.
They afforded the stimulus to hiabrief giddy, and fatal career. They
turned a deaf ear.to the remonstrances of his friends. The tears and
eutreatiew of his mother ivere unavailing. It would be a gross perversion, of.justice to allow these claims. It is ordered and.decreed,
that theexception of.the plaintiff to the master's report be sustained,
and that the.whQle of the claims of creditors reported upon by the
master, be rejected...
There ar. other matters in this case which I must now decide.
The plaintiff's testator Wm. M. Edings, in his lifetime contracted a
debt with thedefendants, Gregg, Hayden &Company, who were jew.
ellers, to the amount ofabout two thousand four hundred dollars, for
goods and wares i their line of busines. For the purpose, they say,
"ofgving greater certainty to their claim against the said Wm.M.
lidings, they,.the said Gregg, Hayden &.Co., with the assent of W.
M. EdbxgN,.fected an insurance on his life, with a Boston Insurance
Company. The policy was for the term of four years, and the sum
of $2,5.00.' It bore date the 18th Oct. 1848. . The premium on the
policy,:amounting to $58, ia.s paid by Gregg, Hayden & Co. It
was negotiated in the name of Win. M. Eings, who in pursuance
of a previous agreement, assigned the policy to Gregg, Hayden & Co
The premium was charged in their books against Edings, but no
part of it has ever been paid by him or his legal representative.
Since the death of Edings, Gregg, Haydin & Co. have received
from the Insurance Company twenty-five hundred dollars, with the
consent of the administrator, and under an agreement with him,
that the said sum of $2,500 shall be held by them, subject to the
order of this Court in the premises. They claim only so much of
the net proceeds of the said policy as will be sufficient to satisfy
their demands against Win. M. Edings, and offer to pay over the
balance to the administrator. If they retain the net proceeds of
the policy, they have been overpaid.
The defendants, Edgerton & Richards, also having demands
against Wm. M. Edings to the amount of $4,531 71, effected an
insurance upon his life for the same purposes as in the case of Gregg,
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Hayden & Co., in the New York Life Insurance Company, for the
sum of $2,000. The policy was dated the 15th March, 184T.' It
was taken in the name of Edgerton & Richards, who paid out of
their own funds the premium and expenses for four years. It was
all done with the knowledge and consent of Win. M. Edinks. After
his death, they received from the Life Insurance Company of New
York the sum of $1,988 87, according to the terms and conditions
of the policy. They paid in the way of premium, &c., during the
four years, the sum of $103. The net proceeds of the policy were
$1,880 87j, a sum not sufficient to pay one half of their claim.
The administrator claims the whole net.proceeds of both of these
policies, as belonging to the estate of Win. M. Edings. I have
come to a different conclusion. I think that these parties having
negotiated these policies at their own expense, and for their own
benefit and security, are fairly entitled to have the net proceeds
applied in the way they intended, namely, as payments upon their
claims against Edings. They were obviously intended as collateral
securities. A third party who is sui juris, may become bound for
the debt of an infant, though the infant would be discharged. And
I apprehend it would make no difference whether the third party
were a corporation or a natural person. If the creditor of an infant,
for a consideration paid by himself, obtains a guaranty of the infant's
debt from a third party, I see no reason why such third party should
not be bound, nor why the creditor should not have the benefit of
his bargain. This I th'ink is the true nature of this transaction.
The infant certainly is not entitled to the funds thence arising. This
would be to give him the whole of the creditor's goods on the plea
of infancy, and as a premium on the plea, the whole proceeds of the
policies.
It is ordered and decreed, that the exception of Gregg, Hayden
& Co., to the master's report on this point, be sustained, that the
claim of the said Gregg, Hayden & Co. against Win. M. Edings be
paid out of the net proceeds of the policy received by them, with
interest on their claim till they received payment from the said Life
Insurance Company; and that they pay over the balance, if any, to
the administrator of Win. M. Edings, which they have offered to do
in their answer.
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It is further ordered and decreed, that the exception to the master's report of Edgerton A Richards which relates to the proceeds
of the poli -of Insurance received by them be sustained,, and that
the said Edgerton & Richards. be allowed to retain the proceeds of
said policy, as a payment on their account against the said William
M. Edings;
It is further ordered and decreed, that the master's report be conformed to this decree.
It is further ordered and decreed, tiat, all the parties in this
cause pay each his own costs; except the administrator with the
will annexed of Win. M. Edings, whose costs shall be charged upon
the estate.
The Court of appeals affirmed the decree.
(Jooper & Rivers, for Complainants..
r.
MWaleI.
, Whaley, and Brown
defendants.

Porter,for yarious

In the Court of.Common Pleas, Hami ton Cowty, Ohio, January
Trmn, 1854.
FRANCIS A. PARISH VS. ELIPHALET FERRIS ET AL.

1. "Heirs" construed to mean children, from the context.
2. Adverbs of time, as when,, then, after, from, &c., in a devise of a remainder are
to be construed as-relating to the time of the enjoyment of the estate, not to that
of its vesting in interest.
3. Devise of a-life estate, and if the first taker "should die without children," then
over, hed under the circumstances to mean without having had children.
4. A testator devised as follows: Secondly, "to my daughter E, the use" of 267
acres of land, "during her natural life- to have full use and control of the same,
with the appurtenances to the same belonging, as long as she shall live." Thirdly, He devised to his "daughter E's children, (if she shall have any heirs,) their
heirs and assigns forever," the 267 acres of land "after E is done using and occupying it, and at L's death." Fourthly, If his "daughter E should die without
children," then he devised the 267 acres to his "brothers and sisters, their heirs
and assigns forever, after the death of E as aforesaid." E was unmarried at the
testator's death, but married afterwards. She had but one child, which lived
only a few hours, and soon died herself, having devised all her estate to her husband.
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Held, that the limitation to E's children, and that to the testator's brothers and
sisters, were altfrnative contingent remainders in fee, the contingency being the
birih of children; and that the first remainder vestedin E's child at its birth, descended at its death, upon E; and then passed under her will to her husband.

Petition to quiet title.
Worthington and Matthews, for Plaintiff.
Taft & Storer, Sage, G-royune and William Johnston for Defendants.
The Opinion of the Court was delivered by
STALLO, J.-This is a petition filed by the plaintiff; Francis A.
Parish, in which he seeks to have his title quieted to some two
hundred and sixty acres of land in Hamilton county. The defendants, in their answer, deny the plaintiff's title, claiming the legal
title to be in themselves. The facts upon which the controversy
arises are substantially the following:
On the 7th day of June, 1849, Andrew Ferris, having an only
daughter then unmarried, made his will, in which he undertook to
devise the property in dispute. This will contained the following
clauses:
"Secondly-I give to my daughter Elizabeth A. the use of two
hundred acres, more or less, of land, on which I now live, it being
the north-east quarter of section No. 22, of the fourth township, of
thesecond fractional range, in the Miami purchase, and one share
of the Morrison estate, on the south-east quarter of section 23, of
said township; also, six acres, more or less, in section 21 of said
township, it being the west half of the north-east quarter of said
section, exclusive of the forfeiture, during her natural life, to have
full use and control of the same, with the appurtenances to the same
belonging, as long as she shall live.
"Thirdly-I give and bequeath to my daughter Elizabeth's
chilren (if she shall have any heirs), their heirs aid assigns forever,
all of the above described two hundred and sixty-seven acres of land,
after Elizabeth is done using and occupying it, and at Elizabeth's
death.
"1Fourthly-If my daughter Elizabeth A. shall die without
children, then, and in that case, I give and bequeath the said 267
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acres, above described, to my brothers and sisters, their heirs and
assigns forever, after the death of Elizabeth A., as aforesaid."
The will was duly proven in 1849, after the death of Andrew
Ferris. In 1850, Elizabeth A. married Francis A. Parish, the
present plaintiff, and in 1852 she was delivered of a child, which
lived only about one hour. On the 22d of August, 1852, a few days
after the death of her child, she made her will, devising to her
husband, his heirs and assigns forever, all her property, and soon
after died, leaving no children surviving her.
Andrew Ferris left brothers and sisters, the defendants in this
case, surviving .his daughter.
The controversy in the case arises upon the construction of Andrew Ferris' will; and in consequence of the wide range pursued in the
argument on both sides, we deem it necessary at the outset briefly
to adduce the cardinal principles of construction applicable to wills,
as we understand them to be settled.
I. Wills are not construed strictly, like deeds, but liberally, so
that the manifest intention of the testator, though not expressed in
technical terms, may be effectuated; for wills, unlike deeds, are
usually made by persons when they are unable to avail themselves
of the assistance of persons skilled in the law. Nevertheless,
1st. The intention of the testator must be collected from the will,
and from that alone.
2d. Technical words are presumed to be used in their established
legal acceptation, unless the contrary plainly appears; and other
words are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense,
unless a clear intention to use them in another sense can be collected
from the context.
3d. The general rules for discovering the intentions of the testator,
as established by adjudged cases, as well as the adjudicated meaning
of certain*words or expressions, are to be adhered to; and
4th. The construction must be such, if possible, that the testator's
intent is consistent with the rules of law.
I-.The manifest general intent controls particular expressions,
which may seem to be at variance with it. But,
1st. A mere reason presumed or expressly assigned, or an induc-
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tive inference from other parts of the will, or an inaccurate
summing up or reference to the contents of the will -by the testatoi,
himself, cannot prevail over an express and positive devise.
2d. Mere inconvenience or absurdity of a devise is no ground for
varying the construction, when the terms are without ambiguity,
although conflicting expressions are to be so construed as to effectuate
a rational and consistent, rather than an irrational and inconsistent
purpose; and the construction is not to be varied, because the
testator did not foresee all the consequences.
8d. Favor or disfavor .to the object, appearing from the will itself
or aliunde, cannot affect the construction..
III. Next to those of the testator, the law favors its own intentions; and, therefore, wills are neverso construed as to disinherit
the heir at law, unless this be required by the express words of the
will, or their necessary implication.
We have recited these rules, rather pedantically, perhaps, because
the simple statement of them relieves us from the necessity of
examining in detail a variety of somewhat strained positions taken
in the construction of this will, into which counsel appear to have
been betrayed by insisting upon rules which are true only when
taken with their appropriate limitations.
Keeping the above principles of 'interpretation and construction
in view, then, I shall now proceed to the task of ascertaining, if
possible, the meaning of Andrew Ferris' will. So far as this affects
the case in hand, it -is to be gathered from the 2d, 8d and 4th clauses
of the will, as above quoted.
The language of the second clause does not require any particular
comment for the purposes of its own construction; it is obviously
the devise of a life estate to Elizabeth A. Parish.
The language of the first part of the third clause is': "I give and
bequeath to my daughter Elizabeth's children (if she. shall have any
heirs), their heirs and assigns forever, all the above described 26"
acres of land." But for the distinction between the words "children"
and "heirs" in their legal and grammatical import, this would be
at once conceded to mean the limitation of a remainder, after
Elizabeth's life estate, to her children, contingent upon their birth.
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Now, does the use of the word "heir," instead of "children," in
the parenthetical reference after the latter word vary the construction ? We think not. The word "heir" is evidently not defined
by its strict grammatical or legal acceptation; for, if it were,'it
would embrace collateral heirs, and the sense thus resulting would
not only be manifestly repugnant to the other provisions of the will,

but the word would be an utter anomaly in the place where it occurs,
having no possible connection with the word children, to which it is
parenthetically appended. And after we have once been constrained
to discard the strict legal import of the word "heirs," it can only

-be defined by its obvious reference to the immediately preceding
word "children," for which it then becomes a mere substitute, so
that the accent falls on the word "have." The devise then is to
Elizabeth's children, if she should have any, which undoubtedly
creates a remainder over to the children, contingent upon their birth.
The doctrine that the word "heirs" may be construed to mean
children, if the manifest intention of the testator requires it, rests

upon the authority of numerous cases; among them a case in our
own State, that of King vs. Beck, 15 Ohio, 559.

But, in the second half of this clause, the testator adds the words:
"after Elizabeth is done using 6r occupying it, and at Elizabeth's
death." It is contended that the use of these words is evidence of
an intention to point out the time of Elizabeth's death as the period
when the remainder over to the children was to vest, so that not the
birth of the -children, but their surviving their mother, was the
contingency upon which the vesting of the remainder depended.
This argument is valid, if the testator meant to postpone the vesting
in interest of the estate, as devised to Elizabeth's children, to the
time of her death; but it falls to the ground, if he merely intended
to designate the time when the possession was to be taken. Abstracting from the fourth clause of the will, we think it clear that
the latter view is correct, and that the words of the third section
relate merely to the time of the enjoyment of the estate, and not
to the period when it was to vest in interest. In this connection, it
is important to revert to the language of the second clause, under
which Elizabeth is "to have full use and control of the property as
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long as she shall live ;" just as in the third clause the same property
is given to -Elizabeth's children, "after Elizabeth is done using and
occupying it, and at Elizabeth's death." The language in both
instances fixes the limit between the "use and occupancy;" in other
words, the possession by the mother, and the possession by the
children. What was to succeed the "1use and occupancy" by the
mother ? Naturally not the interest of the children, but the "use
and occupancy" by them.
The view we take of the meaning of this part of the third section
of the will is, then, that the words "1after Elizabeth is done using
and occupying it, and at Elizabeth's death" were meant to express
simply the fact that a remainder was to vest in Elizabeth's children,
if she have any, and not the time when that reinainder was to vest.
This view becomes very striking, when we recollect that the will
has a separate clause for each single devise. Each clause disposes
of the testator's property to a certain extent; and it is very difficult to escape the conviction, that the effect of every succeeding
clause, in the testator's mind, was to extend over so much ground
only as was not covered by the preceding clause or clauses, so that
having once ascertained the scope of the devise 'in the .preceding
clauses, the extent and validity of,the subsequent deviies is preliminarily determined. Thus, in the second clause, the testator
gives a life estate to Elizabeth; there was then a remainder left.
This* remainder is to go to Elizabeth's children; and in the first
half of the third clause, "I give and bequeath to my .daughter
Elizabeth's children, (if she shall have any heirs,) their heirs and
assigns forever, &c.," the testator expresses his intention that an
estate shall vest in these children, if any there be; and in the latter half, "after Elizabeth is done using and occupying it, and at
her death," he defines this estate as the remainder after the life
estate of Elizabeth. In the first half of the claupe he designates
the persons who are to be the objects of his bounty; in the latter
half he describes the thing, the nature of the bounty he means to
confer.
The rule of construction which is here applied to the words
relating to the death of the first taker, is established by a series
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of authorities. Among them we may refer to a very recent case,
that of Johnson vs. Valentine, 4 Sandford Rep. 36, which is
selected because it expressly decides that "adverbs of time, as
when, then, after, from, &c.,in a devise of a remainder, are construed to relate merely to the time of the enjoyment of the
estate, and not to the time of the vesting in interest;" and because
it thus disposes also of the argument derived from the fourth
clause of the will, where the language, "after the death of Elizabeth" is employed, from which, in connection with the words
already commented upon, counsel infer that the state of things
at Elizabeth's death was the time contemplated by the testator
for the vesting of the remainder. Other cases to the same effect,
illustrative of the principle (from which this rule follows,) that
the law favors the vesting of estates, will be hereafter noticed
in another connection.
After thus giving to his daughter Elizabeth a life estate, in the
second clause, and a remainder over to her children, if she. had
any, in the third, what further had the testator to dispose of?
Obviously nothing; unless, in the language of the third clause,
Elizabeth "shall have no heirs.;" i. e., shall have no children.- In
the progress of the exhaustion of the estate, through all its parts
and contingencies, the testator then arrived at the fourth clause,
which reads: "If my daughter Elizabeth A. shall die without
children, then," &c. The contingency referred to in third clause,
we have seen, was, that Elizabeth might have no children; in the
fourth clause, the same contingency, instead of being spoken of in
the same words, is denoted by the expression "dying without
children." The phrase "to have no children," would seem to be
plain enough; it does not mean to have no children at any particular time, but it means, to have no children at all, at any time,to have no children born. The contingency, as first contemplated
by the testator, and referred to in the third clause of the will,
was, therefore, that his daughter Elizabeth might never have any
children. Now, does the use of the different words "dying without children," evidently descriptive of the same contingency, force
us to conclude that the testator had changed his mind when he
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wrote or dictated the fourth clause ? We think not. It may be
difficult to determine, whether the more natural meaning of these
words be "dying without having had children," or "dying without
children living at the parent's death." But the question we are
now considering Is not, whether the former be the more natural
interpretation, but, whether it be generally an admissible interpretation; in other words, we are now inquiring, whether or not there
be any necessary repugnance between the words of the fourth and
those of the third clause, relating to the same subject-matter. And
we cannot see that the words "dying without children" are violently distorted from their true meaning by being interpreted to
mean "dying without having had children."
This leads us to a consideration of the authorities cited on either
side, hiefly in reference to the construction of the words "dying
without children." It is urged on the one hand that these words
are equivalent to "dying without issue," which latter words have
been adjudged in an almost interminable series of cases to mean not
a dying without issue living at the time of the death of the first
taker, but a general or indefinite failure of issue. On the other
hand, it is contended that the words "dying without children" are
by the authorities distinguished from the words "dying without
issue," and restricted to the sense of "dying without children"
living at the death of the first taker.
We have examined these cases as carefully as time would permit,
and we think it cannot be denied that looking to the mere letter
the authorities appear to be conflicting. But we also think that,
in a great measure at least, the discrepancy vanishes when it is
recollected that all these cases deal with the construction of wills
and not with that of deeds or other deliberately framed instruments; that they seek to define not the force of a word, but the
general sense of a context; and that from the very nature of the
investigation the tendency there is to fuse words and their meaning, not .to petrify them. When we come to examine what were
the questions raised in the different cases, and upon what grounds
the decisions rest, they can, with few exceptions, be harmonized
without much difficulty.
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Without attempting to review all the cases in detail, tlen, we
will simply announce thp conclusion at which we have arrived:
that the distinction between the words "dying without issue or
heirs" and "dying without children," wherever it is made, is made
solely with the view of escaping the rigor of the rule that executory devises limited to take effect after a dying without heirs, or
witout issue, or without leaving issue, are void, because the con-

tingency is too remote-the words "dying without issue," &c.,
having invariably been held to import an indefinite failure of issue.
In order to uphold the intentions of the testator against the
effect of this construction, courts have availed themselves of the
slightest circumstance, the least variation in the phraseology, in
order to construe the failure of issue contemplated by the testator
as definite-as occurring at a precise time fixed by the testator
himself, such as the death of the first taker-and not as indefinite,
as happening sooner or later, whenever the whole line of descendants
of te first taker should have become extinct. Thus, courts have
adopted one rule of construction in regard to bequests of personal
property, and applied another to devises of real estate, even going
so far as to interpret the same words differently in the same will,
on the ground that owing to the perishable nature of personalty,
the testator could not reasonably be presumed to have contemplated
the failure of issue at a period indefinitely remote, when the property itself would be no longer in existence. So also the use of the
word "children," instead of "issue," coupled with other expressions
in the will clearly indicative of the testator's intent, has been construed to limit the failure of issue to the time of the death of the
first taker; because "children," in the primary sense of the word,
are descendants of the first degree, and not, like "issue," descendants generally. But in order to appreciate the value and scope of
this distinction, it is important to bear in mind two things. .First,
that the question in those cases where the distinction was made
was, whether or not the executory devise was valid, at all, in any
case, no matter what the facts otherwise might be; i. e., whether or
not upon its face, and upon a mere interpretation of the words
",dying without children," &c., the executory devise should. be pro-

110

PARISH vs. FERRIS ET AL

nounced void for remoteness, in spite of the obvious intent of the
testator, even if there never had been any children; and therefore
the question was, not so much when the estate limited over was to
take effect, but whether or not the estate was, in any event, to take
effect at all;- so that the question, of time was merely incidental:
and secondly, (what is in substance the same,) that the question
stood between an indefinite time when the devise was meant to take
effect, and a definite time, and not between one definite time (the
death of the first taker,) and another equally definite time (the
birth of a child of the first taker). Indeed' the very reason-why
the definite is preferred to the indefinite period is, that the former
is less remote; and it would be a strange perversion of the whole
reasoning, which upholds the distinction claimed for the defendants,
if it were so applied in this case as to postpone the vesting of the
estate instead of hastening it.
The true doctrine illustrated by all these cases is, that the law
favors the -resting of estates; a doctrine which is supported by all
the authorities. We have no doubt, therefore,'that the contingent
remainder limited to Elizabeth's children vested at the moment of
the birth of the first child, subject to dpen and let in after-born
children, if any there be. It is almost a matter of supererogation,
to refer to the cases directly bearing'upon this point; we will only
notice a few. One is the case of Macomb vs. Miller, 9 Paigei 265,
where there was a devise to A for life, with remainder to her child
or children, if she should leave any; and if she should die and leave
no lawful issue,-with remainder over. A survived the testator, and
had one child, and she survived her child, and was left a widow. It
was held that the devise to her children or issue was a contingent
remainder in fee, and which, on the birth of a child, became a vested
remainder in fee, subject to open and let in after-born children.
Another very recent case is that of Wight and Wife vs. Baury,
7 Cushing, 105,, where the devise was to the daughter for life, and
then to her children, their heirs and assigns; and if she should
leave no child, then to the testator's grand-children. Judge Shaw,
in deciding this case, says: "In the actual case, as there were
children- in being, it is a vested remainder. It may be proper to
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remark, in passing, that if there were no child in being at the
death of the testator, it would have been a contingent remainder
until a child should be born, but would immediately vest on such
birth." See also 7 East, 521; 12 Engl. Com. Law Raps. 392; 4
Comstock, 257; 2 Barbour Ch. R. 314; 26 Wendell, 229; 17
Serg. & Rawle, 441; 12 Gill. & Johns. 83; 3 Atk. 774, and
other cases.
In apparent hostility to all this, however, stands a case in 5
Day, 517, Aorgan vs. Morgan. The devise there was to the
testator's sons, B, 0, D and E, their heirs and assigns forever,
with a clause, that in case either of his sons should die without
children, his brothers should have his part in equal proportion.,
B was married and had issue, a son, who died during the life of B.
B died and left no children living at the time of his death. It was
held, that the limitation over was good by way of executory devises
and that the words "die without children" meant a dtying without
children living at the death of the first devisee.
'The anomaly of this case is explained, when we look not only to
the decision of the court, but also to the argument; from which it
appears, that in this as in the other cases, the question raised and
decided was, whether or not the executory devise was void for remoteness. That it was not so void, is really the only principle supported by the reasoning of the case; and it does not in the least
shake our faith in the correcteess of the construction we are compelled to give to Andrew Ferris' will.
Against this construction it is urged, in addition to the arguments already noticed, that the manifest general intent of Andrew
Ferris was to keep his property in his own family,-to leave it to
his lineal descendants, in preference to other relatives, but in the
absence of direct issue to give it to his collateral kindred; and that,
if now alive, he would repudiate that construction of his will, the
effect of which is to give the property to a stranger, whom he, perhaps, never saw. This may be so; but it is fully answered by the
supposition of another case put by counsel for the plaintiff. Elizabeth might have had a child, which, living to the age of maturity,
might itself have had issue, and then died before Elizabeth, leaving,
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not a child, but a grand-child surviving Elizabeth. If the testator's
intention was, that his property should go to his lineal descendants
in preference to his collateral heirs, this intention would then surely
have been defeated by the construction now claimed on behalf of
the defendants. The truth is, the testator's intention must, be
ascertained by the fair construction of his will, nbt by conjecture;
after all, it is the intent of his written testament which wo are to
seek, not a possible intention of the testator in case he had foreseen
every imaginable contingency. We cannot attribute to him a shfting intention varying with the play of unforeseen events. His last
will and testament is the fixed, irrevocable word of a dying man;
we can, in pious regard for his last wishes, concede to it all the
pliability necessary to accommodate one abiding purpose, but we
cannot quicken it with the consistent activity of a living mind, and
its fresh, present, continuing volition. Andrew Ferris, undoubtedly, had a theo'y of the future, by the light of which his will
must be read, and, as is usual, that theory was incomplete, because
it failed to embrace elements which time added to the calculation.
It is for us, however, not to complete that theory by interpolating
the data of subsequent experience, but, if, possible, to reproduce
the testator's faint vision, in order thus to see how the objects and
events among which he contemplated the course of his property to
lie will group themselves. The true construction of Andrew Ferris'
will must be the same now, as it would have been given in 1849,
before or immediately after the testator's death, when the marriage
of Elizabeth with Francis A. Parish was only one among many
other possibilities which have never been realized.
Our opinion is, that the devises to Elizabeth's children and to
Andrew Ferris' brothers and sisters are alternative contingent
remainders, of which the former vested at the birth of Elizabeth's
child, whereby the latter was defeated. There will accordingly be
judgment for the plaintiff, quieting his title.

COMMONWEALTH vs. SAMANTHIA HUTCHINSON.

Pennsylvania Sixth Judicial -Distrit.
COMMONWEALTH VS.

SAMANTHIA.. HUTCHINSON.

1. No indictment can now be sustained in Pennsylvania, against a female, as a common scold.

2. Whether an indictment concluding against -theIpeace "of fhe faithful 8ubjects of
this Commonwealth" is good, dubitatur.

This was an indictment against the defendant Samanthia, as a
common scold, upon which she was found guilty of the charge. A
motion for a new trial, and in arrest of judgment was made upon
reasons which will appear in the opinion-of the Court.
GALBRAITH, P. J.-The motion for a new trial is overruled, as a
new trial would be unnecessary, if even sufficient grounds for it existed, for the reasons given on the motion in arrest of judgment.
The reasons on which the latter motion is founded, are mainly
two, viz:
1st. That the form of the indictment is defective and erroneous,
in charging the defendant as "a common scold and disturber of the
peace of the neighborhood, and of -all faithful subjects of this Commonwealth," &c.
2d. That the offence of common scolding is not indictable as a
crime in Pennsylvania.
There is probably much force in the first reason mentioned: that
we know no such term as subject in this country, by which to designate the people; or as constituting a part of the living, intelligent
and rational members of the body politic. But as this objection
goes only to the formal part of the indictment, and a decision upon
it but little, if any, practical importance, it is better to meet the
whole charge upon its merits, so that if the decision is deemed erroneous, it may be taken before the Supreme Court and set right,
or expressly provided for by legislative enactment; and that the
time of the Quarter Sessions may not be occupied, and the administration of justice burdened and encumbered with proceedings so
unprofitable, and may I not say, as mischievous, as those under consideration have most generally proved. Such prosecutions originated in a different age from that in which it has been our lot to be
cast.
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They belong to that age of barbarism when women were burnt as
witches, and men had their ears nailed to a pillory-when learning
and ingenuity were put to the rack to invent contrivances for punishment and torture, instead of reformation and moral and mental
culture. Where is the law which requires, or authorizes this Court to
inflict any punishment upon the defendant here ? Is there any act of
the legislature defining the offence, or prescribing the sentence that
shall be pronounced against it ? Any decision of the Supreme
Court which declares either? The case of Nancy James, reported
in 12 S. & R. 220, has been referred to, but that case, so far from
requiring a sentence in this case, is authority against it. The whole
reasoning of the Court is against'it, notwithstanding Judge Duncan, who delivers the opinion, says that he accedes to the opinion
of his brethren in considering the offence as indictable. That was
not the point in the case, and no authority is to be drawn from it,
when every argument he uses against the particular sentence in that
case, would apply nearly if not quite as forcibly to the question of
its being indictable at all.
Penal laws form an important element in the organization of all
civilized and well-ordered communities; and vitally concern the
peace, happiness and security of the members. An essential requisite in every penal law.is, that it should be free from uncertainty or
obscurity. Every citizen has a right to know what acts are to be
regarded as criminal, so clearly defined, and the punishment so explicitly described that there may be no danger of mistake. Now,
who can tell what acts shall constitute a common scold, (communis
rixatrix, or ruxatrix ?) It is laid down in the books that the evidence by which the fact is to be established, shall not be of particular acts, but of common fame.
The defendant is thus left to the
mercy of the witnesses, the opinion they may entertain and express
through the poisoned medium of prejudice, personal malice, as is
believed to be generally the case.
And who can prepare to meet such evidence? The jaundiced
opinion of a witness, operating upon the opinion of a jury, is made
the basis upon which a verdict is predicated, and upon which the
liberty, character and happiness of the defendant for life depend.
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Again: who can tell what punishment shall follow a verdict of
conviction? The Supreme Court have decided that the only defined punishment we find in the books-the ducking or "cucking
stool-is obsolete and abrogated. What then ? Fine and imprisonment ? Where ? how long to be confined ? how maintained ? what
amount of fine? Is any citizen, male or female,, to be subjected to
so vague, undefined -and unprescribed infliction, and suffer the privation of property, liberty and character, at the arbitrary will of
any man? I entertain an instinctive abhorrence of such a position,
and can never give my consent to its sanction.
Again: can a sound reason be assigned why that should be
criminal-punished by fine to any unlimited amount, and imprisonment in a dungeon without limit as to duration-when acted by a
woman, and innocent and lawful when acted by a man? The origin
of such unjust distinction is too flagrantly congenial with that state
of barbarism in which womafi was regarded as the slave and not the
companion of man-when the belief practically obtained that she
was destitute of a soul. Christian civilization has assigned to her
a different position-a just claim to equality of right and consideration ; and therefore, a law which draws a. distinction so degrading
to the woman can find no countenance in our institutions, based
upon the great principle of universal equality.
Another error of barbarism entered into the invention of a punishment for this as well as other petty offences in the manner mentioned in the old books. The purpose and object of punishment
was supposed to be the meting out of justice by the infliction of a
certain amount of pain or degradation commensurate with the supposed evil done-a compulsory and arbitrary expiation or payment
for the act already committed, by way of vindicatingthe law. The
notion of cruelty, torment or degradation as the design and purpose
of punishment, has happily in a great measure vanished and passed
away, and the true and more enlightened purpose of punishment
discovered in the reformation, improvement and amelioration of the
offender. With this in view, as the only legitimate purpose of penal
infliction, the result of a more civilized and cultivated state, the trial,
conviction, sentence, and all the degrading parade accompanying
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a grave charge against a persecuted or unfortunate woman as a common scold, would be strikingly ridiculous and absurd-at war with
the more benign, true and enlightened sentiments of the public on
the subject of punishment, and tending rather to defeat than to
advance the objects of penal law, and bring the administration of
justice into reproach.
Without multiplying further, or adding reasons that might be
given, the judgment in this case is arrested, and the defendant
discharged.

Common Pleas, PhiladelphiaCounty, Pa., 1854.
CHILLAS vs. BRETT.

Under the Act of 1845, with regard to appeals in equity, an appeal perfected, after
the levy of afi.fa., or a decree, but before sale, is a supersedeas.

In Equity. Rule to show cause why a writ of vend. exp. should
not be awarded.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
THomPsoN, P. J.-The decree in this case was for the payment
of money by the receiver. The plaintiff obtained a writ of ft. fa.
to enforce the decree, 'as prescribed by the rules of Court. The
sheriff levied upon the goods of the receiver, and three days after
the levy, the defendant took his appeal. It is contendea by the
plaintiff, that the appeal taken after the levy upon the fl. fa., was
no supersedeas, and he moves that a writ of vend. exponas be
awarded.
The Act of 17th of March, 1845, which regulates appeals in suits in
equity, prescribes the same terms and regulations, as are provided
in case of appeals from the decree of our Orphans' Court, viz: The
party appealing, must give security by recognizance, make oath
that the appeal is not intended for delay, and perfect his appeal
within three years after the final decree. These terms being complied with, the appeal shall stay all proceedings in the Orphans'
Court. In addition to a compliance with the terms and regula-
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tions, required in an appeal from the Orphans' Court, the Act of
1845, further requires, that in order to secure a stay or supersedeas of execution in equity, where the decree is for the payment
of money, the appellant is required to give a bond to the adverse
party, in at least double the amount of the sum decreed to be paid,
with two sufficient sureties, to be approved by the Court; and it
declares that such appeal being so perfected, shall stay allfurther
proceedings in said Court, upon the order or decree appealedfrom,
and upon the subject matter embraced in such order or decree. The
evident intention of the act is, that if such appeal be perfected
within the period allowed for the appeal, and before the decree is
performed, the decree or order shall not be enforced. The process by
which decrees are usually enforced in equity, whether attachment or
sequestration, cannot be proceeded with after the appeal; the entire proceeding is arrested. The adoption by the Court of the
writ of ft. fa. as final process to execute decrees for the payment of
money cannot, of course, alter the effect which the law designed to
give the perfected appeal, and where such writ has not been fully
executed, before the appeal is perfected, the Court can do no act
by which the decree may be enforced. In this case, the levy has
been made upon the fi. fa., and so returned by the Sheriff. At
common law, such an execution is considered executed, and a writ
of error is too late to arrest the sale of the goods levied on, but undoubtedly, such sale in this case would be a proceeding upon the
decree appealed from. By authorizing the vend. exp., the Court
would be enforcing that decree, which by the plain terms of the
Act of Assembly, they have not the power to do while the appeal is pending. The rule therefore, must be discharged.

In the New-York Supreme Court.
MATHEWS VS. MATHEWS.
An exception in a grant of lands in these words, "excepting and reserving out of the
said piece of land so much as is necessary for the use of a grist mill on the east
side of the road at the west end of the said mill-dam," is a good exception; but
until the grantor or his assigns exercise the right reserved, and builds the mill, it
is not operative, and ejectment cannot be sustained.

MATHEWS vs. MATHEWS.

The plaintiff brought ejectment to recover the land described in
the exception contained in the deed, hereinafter mentioned. The
defendant pleaded title out of plaintiff and in himself.
On the trial it appeared in evidence, ".that on the 2d day of
February, 1809, John and Stephen Delematter (the then owners of
the premises under a conveyance from William Cook, who derived
his title directly from the soldier,) and their wives, by deed recorded
27th February, 1811, in consideration of $1000, conveyed to Ste.phen Wilcox fifty acres in the south-east corner of lot sixteen
Manlius, and made a reservation in said deed as follows :" Excepting and reserving out of said piece of land so much as is necessary
for the use of a grist-mill on the east side of the road at the west
end of the saw-mill-dam," and that the pleintiff has, by a number
of deeds, received a regular conveyance of the privilege and right
of all the same, specified in said exception and reservation.
That the plaintiff in 1821 or 1822, erected a grist-mill adjoining
the premises (but not on lot 16 Manlius, the reserved premises,)
and has occupied the same up to the time of the commencement of
this suit, and the dam which was built in 1808 or 1804, that raises
the water for the use of the grist-mill, is partly-on the land embraced in said exception, and the water so raised flows some portion
thereof, and the plaintiff has entered on and upon said land embraced
in said exception from time to time for the last twenty-five years,
for the purpose of repairing his dam, and the greater portion of the
premises so excepted are necessary for the use of the grist-mill of
the plaintiff adjoining the premises contained in said exceptions for
the purpose of having the dam as a part thereof, thereon, and to be
flowed with water and to procure earth and material to repair the
dam as well as to enter upon the same for that purpose. The centre'of Chittenango Creek is the east line of lot sixteen Manlius.
The plaintiff had judgment, and on a case agreed a motion was
made for a new trial.
H. Burdeck, for Plaintiff.
Le Boy Morgan, for Defendant.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
PRATT, J.-The principal question involved in this case has been
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settled by au adjudication in this Court in the case. of Dyge'rt vs.
Mathews, 11 Wend. 35. That was an action of trespass brought in
1830, in the Onondaga Comnion Pleas by Dygert, who was then
in possession of the premises now in dispute against Mathews the
present plaintiff, for taking gravel therefrom to repair the mill-dam.
Mathews attempted to justify under the same title upon which he
claims to recover in the present action. Upon the trial in that case
it was ruled that the premises in question did not pass by the deed
from Delematter to Wilcox, and that it was not necessary for Mathews in order to avail himself of the exception in that deed, to
build his grist-mill upon the premises excepted. The defendant
obtained a verdict upon which judgment was entered, and the cause
was carried to the Supreme Court upon writ of error, where the
judgment .of the Common Pleas was reversed. The Supreme Court
held that the exception in the deed to Wilcox was not intended to
except from the operation of the grant the absolute fee of the land,
but, that it was designed to reserve simply a mill site or privilege;
that until the right reserved should be exercised by the grantor or
his assigns by building the mill upon the same premises, the reservation would be inoperative and the whole premises would vest in
the grantee and his assigns. The decision in that case covers the
whole ground and is well sustained by the cases of Diompson vs.
Gregory, 4 J. R. 81, and Provost vs. Calder, 2 Wend. 517, cited
by the learned judge who gave the opinion of the Court. It is true
the language of his opinion would seem to lay down a proposition
which cannot be sustained in the broad terms in which it is enunciated. He says "those cases" (alluding to the cases above cited)
"recognize the doctrine that strictly an exception of a part of the
thing granted is void, but an incident to the grant may be reserved."
I find no such doctrine advanced in those cases, but directly the re,verse is the rule laid down in the books. An exception to be good
99must be a part of the thing granted and not of some other thing,"
Shep. Touchstone, 78; Co. upon Litt. 47; and 1 Atkinson on
Con. 322; 2 Prest. on Con. 462. It is true, the exception must
not be repugnant to the grant, and therefore it must be of a particular thing out of a general, and not of a particular thing out of a
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particular thing. For instance, if one grant White-acre and Blackacre, excepting White-acre, the exception would be void, for Whiteacre being mentioned by name in the grant, the exception of the
same thing granted would be repugnant and therefore void. So if
one grant twenty acres of land excepting one acre, the exception is
void, but if the grant is, of all that close containing twenty acres,
excepting one acre, the exception would be good, for in this instance,
it is the clos, and not the particular twenty acres, which is granted.
Shep. Touchstone, 78. So far therefore as the exception in this
case was of a part of the thing granted, it niight be good, provided
the design of the parties had been to except from the operation of
the grant the premises in question, and the premises had been described with sufficient certainty.
And this leads us to the consideration of another rule in regard
to exceptions in a grant which bears more directly upon the conveyance in question in this case. The description of the thing excepted must be as certain as if it were granted. Prest. on Con. 462;
1 Atkinson on Con. 382. "If one grant a house excepting one
chamber, or grant a manor, excepting one acre, but doth not set
forth which chamber, or which acre, it shall be these exceptions are
void for uncertainty." Shep. Touchstone, 79. Under this rule
it is manifest that as an attempt to reserve out of the operation of
the grant, the fee of the land, the exception in the deed to Wilcox
would be void for uncertainty. It would be entirely uncertain
until the mill should be built, and the land appropriated, how much
land would be necessary or where located.
It was for the same reason that the Court in the case of Thompson vs. Gregory, held the exception in that case void as an exception of the land itself. They held it void for uncertainty and not
because the exception was of part of the thing granted as the learned
judge seemed to assume in the case of Dygert vs. Mathews.
But as the reservation of a mill privilege, which is a mere incident to the grant, the exception is good. As it would be inoperative until the right should be exercised, no such certainty is requisite. The title of the property would pass to the grantee, subject
to the reserved right, and he would be invested with the absolute

